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A 1997 report by the Council of Economic Advisers started a large 
research effort about the effects of the unemployment rate on the 
welfare participation rate and vice-versa, with special regard to the 
1990s in the United States. In this paper the relationship between the 
US unemployment rate and the welfare participation rate is examined in 
a structural VAR. It is found that the unemployment rate does not 
Granger-cause the welfare participation rate, while the converse is true. 
Moreover, a negative shock to the welfare participation rate predicts a 
reduction in the unemployment rate. The conclusion is that the decline 
in the welfare participation rate in the 1990s should be attributed to 
restrictive welfare reforms, not to the fall in the unemployment rate. 
Further, the political choice to reduce the welfare participation rate may 
have inflated the reduction in the unemployment rate, by increasing the 
number of people willing to accept peripheral jobs, for instance in the 
Eating and drinking places. 
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1. Introduction  
The aim of this paper can be thought as twofold. First, it is argued that 
the decline in the welfare participation rate in the United States in the 
1990s should be attributed to restrictive welfare reforms, not to the 
decline in the unemployment rate. Second, it is argued that the political 
choice to reduce the welfare participation rate - implementing restrictive 
welfare reforms - may have inflated the fall in the unemployment rate in 
the 1990s.  
The paper has the following structure. Section 2  is shortly reviewing the 
literature on the welfare reforms occurred in the United States in the 
1990s. Since a 1997 report by the Council of Economic Advisers 
(hereinafter CEA), there has been an increasing interest on the 
relationship between the unemployment rate and the welfare 
participation rate. Research has analyzed this relationship from a micro-
econometric point of view using panel data. A macro-econometric 
perspective has not received attention yet. This paper takes the latter 
perspective using aggregate time-series data. Sections 3 to 5 present 
an empirical analysis based on a structural VAR model. The analysis is 
aimed to contribute to explain what happened in the 1990s, when both 
the welfare participation rate and the unemployment rate strongly 
decreased. Sections 6 and 7 discuss the results of the empirical 
analysis. Section 8 briefly summarizes the main conclusions. An 
Appendix provides further details on the main empirical analysis of this 
study, also discussing possible criticism. 
2. A brief summary of the literature on the welfare reforms in the 
United States 
During the 1990s, the United States deeply reformed their most 
important welfare program, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children  
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(hereinafter AFDC). The AFDC was created in 1935 with the Social 
Security Act (Title IV) in order to provide financial assistance to needy 
children, being fatherless or motherless (typically fatherless; the original 
name of the program was Aid to Dependent Children). At the beginning 
of the 1990s, the AFDC provided both financial and non-financial 
assistance to needy (income below a certain level) families with 
dependent children. Typical recipients were single parents, often 
mothers, and their dependent children (AFDC-Basic), or unemployed 
parents in two parent-families and their dependent children (AFDC-
Unemployed Parent). The program was implemented by the States. 
State activities were subject to the approval of the Government, which 
financed them largely. The Department of Health and Human Services 
was in charge to control whether State activities were consistent with 
the AFDC law. However, since 1962, the Government could waive 
requirements of the law to allow States to carry out special policies. The 
actual use of waivers only started in the 1980s with some experiments. 
Afterwards, it became a rule. During the first three years of Clinton’s 
Administration, 43 States received a federal waiver. As known, States 
receiving waivers deeply changed the nature of the AFDC program. 
They introduced time limits to aid and family caps, reduced exemptions 
to participation in mandatory activities (work or training), increased 
sanctions (CEA, 1997).  
In 1996 the welfare reforms, begun at State level, were completed at 
federal level by the approval of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). The Act replaced the AFDC 
by the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). The federal 
guarantee of assistance to needy families with children disappeared.   
States received great discretion in defining their own programs, which 
became strongly work-oriented. States had to bring people from welfare 
to work, but they were given a Machiavellian out (Edelman, 1997). In 
fact, the new law allowed States to reach targeted shares of working 
caseloads over total caseloads by simply expelling non-working 
caseloads. Those policies begun with the waivers were strengthened, 
for instance time limits. People having spent 5 years (cumulated) in 
welfare assistance lost eligibility for aid. This lifetime limit interested half 
of caseloads in 1997 from close up (Edelman, 1997).  
The monthly AFDC subsidy per family decreased a lot in the 1990s, 
reaching a new historical negative record every year (US Department of  
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Health and Human Services, 2000). It is un-doubtful that, in the last 
decade, policies helping low-income people were implemented too. 
Examples are the increase in the AFDC earnings disregard, the 
increase in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the increase in 
the minimum wage. However, most of these policies were work-oriented 
on the lines of the welfare policies of the 1990s: they did not help the 
poor, they only helped the poor with a job.      
A report by the CEA (1997) started a large research effort about the 
welfare reforms in the United States in the 1990s, as discussed in the 
recent reviews by Blank (2002) and Moffitt (2002). The welfare 
participation rate, i.e. the share of population receiving AFDC-TANF, 
has declined since its 1994 peak (see B in Figure 1). The decline was 
due to a reduction in the total number of caseloads. Caseloads 
decreased from 14.2 millions in 1993 to 5.7 millions in 2000 (June). A 
large part of the literature has focused on explaining why the welfare 
participation rate declined. The CEA (1997), for example, argues that 
the share of population on welfare has declined both because of the 
strong economy and because of welfare reforms. From 1993 to 1996, 
more than 40% of the decline can be explained by the decrease in the 
unemployment rate (see U in Figure 1). About 13-31% of the decline 
can be attributed to the federal waivers. Similar results can be found in 
Levine and Whitmore (1998), Wallace and Blank (1999), and Blank 
(2001). In contrast with the CEA (1997), Ziliak et al. (2000) argue that 
almost all the decline in the participation rate can be attributed to 
improved economic conditions in the States, and nothing to the waivers. 
In absence of economic factors, there would not have been any decline 
in the participation rate. Similar results are in Figlio and Ziliak (1999). 
In 1999 the CEA extends the analysis to consider the effects of the 
1996 welfare reform (PRWORA). The new report (CEA, 1997) 
maintains that 35-36% of the decline in the participation rate was due to 
the introduction of the TANF. Improved labor market conditions only 
explain 8-10% of the decline, much less than during the period of 1993-
1996 (26-36% in the 1999 revisited estimates for the period of 1993-
1996). Hence TANF had an impact on per-capita caseloads higher than 
waivers (12-15% in the 1999 revised estimates for 1993-1996), while 
the unemployment rate in post-TANF period affected per-capita 
caseloads less. Similar findings are in Schoeni and Blank (2000). 
O’Neill and Hill (2001) find a higher impact of the TANF on AFDC-TANF  
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participation.  
As stressed by Bell (2001), there is a substantial agreement in the 
literature on the argument that the fall in the unemployment rate in the 
1990s mainly or totally caused the fall in the welfare participation rate. 
There is less agreement on contributions of waivers and TANF, 
although most of the authors recognize that changing welfare policies 
affected welfare participation. In addition, while literature has made an 
effort to distinguish among various components of the welfare reform 
(for example, between the effects of family caps, time limits, work 
requirements, earnings disregard), there are not significant common 
results. Sometimes there are unexpected results: for instance, the CEA 
(1999) finds that family caps increased per-capita caseloads; Ziliak et 
al. (2000) have the same result for work-incentive waivers (earnings 
disregard). Sometimes results are more expected: for instance Grogger 
(2000; 2001) finds that time limits decreased welfare use; Kaushal and 
Kaestner (2001) have the same result for both family caps and time 
limits. 
A common denominator of the literature is the lack of agreement on 
how to specify the estimated models from a dynamic point of view. The 
variability of interpretations, which is a key factor in explaining the 
variability of results on the effect of policies, is primarily due to the 
absence of a unitary theoretical framework explaining movements in the 
stock of per-capita caseloads. It has been also argued by Klerman and 
Haider (2002) that the estimated models on the stock of per-capita 
caseloads are generally mis-specified, as they contain a null or non-
sufficient number of lags of the explanatory variables regarding exit or 
entry flows. Due to the shortness of the available time series, authors 
suggest a new procedure to study the stock of per-capita caseloads. 
The stock is simulated by means of a Markov-chain model, after having 
estimated parameters in the transition matrix with data on entry and exit 
flows. Unfortunately, data on flows are not available at aggregate level. 
In fact, Klerman and Haider estimate their ‘stock-flow model’ with data 
from California, and their results cannot be generalized. 
A part of the literature has analyzed the effect of welfare reforms on 
labor market outcomes such as labor force participation, employment, 
and earnings. Research has specially focused on less-educated 
women, single mothers and female-headed families, i.e. typical adults 
and families on welfare assistance. Moffitt (1999), for example, finds  
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that waivers increased hours and weeks of work for less-educated 
women, but without increasing their weekly salaries or annual earnings. 
Schoeni and Blank (2000) have a more positive view of welfare reforms. 
These reforms reduced people dependence on welfare, increased 
earnings and reduced poverty in families with less-educated women. 
The benefits of the 1996 reform were less diffused than those deriving 
from waivers.  
Some studies have dealt with the combined effect of various policy 
changes. For instance, Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) discuss changes 
in fiscal and social policies related to single mothers (typical adults in 
the AFDC-Basic program), such as increased EITC, reduced welfare 
benefits, re-defined job-training programs and increased Medicaid. 
Single mothers registered a rise in both weekly-hours of work and 
employment rate, a rise not found in other low-wage groups and among 
single women without children. Authors attribute the increase in labor 
activity of single mothers mainly to the increased EITC. They found less 
evidence that reduced welfare benefits affected labor activity of single 
mothers. Similar results are in Blank et al. (2000). Instead, Kaushal and 
Kaestner (2001) show that States using waivers, particularly family caps 
and time limits, registered significant increases in work-hours of less 
educated single mothers. Grogger (2001) finds positive effects on labor 
activity of single mothers of both EITC and welfare reforms, particularly 
time limits. However, Ellwood (2000) stresses that the effects of reforms 
are hardly separable from those of EITC and economic expansion.  
Leavers’ studies have shown that most of ex-caseloads (adults) are 
holding a job at some observation in the first years following welfare 
exit. For instance, Martinson (2000) finds that only 20% of leavers has 
never worked in the first four years following welfare exit. Their salaries 
however are very low, between 5.50 and 8.50 dollars per hour.    
This brief summary helps to stress that research on welfare reforms has 
focused on three main issues: 
1.  to what extent the fall in the unemployment rate since its 1992 
peak affected the fall in the welfare participation rate since its 1994 
peak; 
2.  to what extent the welfare reforms since 1992 reduced the 
welfare participation rate; 
3.  to what extent the welfare reforms affected the reduction in the 
unemployment rate, affecting both labor force and employment.  
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Regarding the third issue, an additional comment seems useful. The 
question is whether the welfare reforms forced people, who lost all or 
parts of their welfare assistance, to search for a job, and whether 
people found it. If so, a political choice to reduce the welfare 
participation rate may have affected the reduction in the unemployment 
rate in the 1990s. 
In a general scenario, not strictly related to the 1990s, this literature 
seems to raise two important questions:  
•  whether the unemployment rate helps to predict the welfare 
participation rate; if so, how an exogenous shock to the unemployment 
rate affects the welfare participation rate (see point 1, and indirectly 
point 2);  
•  whether the welfare participation rate helps to predict the 
unemployment rate; if so, how an exogenous shock to the welfare 
participation rate affects the unemployment rate (see point 3). 
Focusing on the 1990s, these two questions remain relevant. In fact, in 
the last decade, one might argue that the United States experienced a 
number of negative shocks to the unemployment rate, due to 
information revolution and investment recovery, and a number of 
negative shocks to the welfare participation rate, due to welfare reforms. 
This paper is aimed to answer the two questions of above by examining 
the relationship between the US unemployment rate and the welfare 
participation rate in a structural VAR model.  
3. Data 
The reviewed literature is based on panel data and on micro-
econometric tools. For instance, the 1997 report by the CEA is based 
on State administrative data from 1976 to 1996, extended to 1998 in the 
second report (1999). The study by Ziliak et al. (2000) is based on the 
same data of the 1997 report by the CEA. Moffitt (1999) uses data for 
the period of 1977-1995 from the March Current Population Survey. 
Schoeni and Blank (2000) use the same source of Moffitt (1999), 
extending the sample up to 1999. Kaushal and Kaestner (2001) use the 
same source, focusing on the period of 1995-1999. Meyer and  
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Rosenbaum (2000) use data from the 1984-1996 Current Population 
Survey Outgoing Rotation Group File, and from the 1985-1997 March 
Current Population Survey.  
Due to the micro-econometric approach, existing research has not yet 
analyzed the relationship between the unemployment rate and the 
welfare participation rate from a macro-econometric point of view. A 
macro-econometric analysis is interesting for various reasons. First of 
all, it is interesting because the literature has stressed that the reduction 
in the welfare participation rate was mainly or totally due to the decline 
in the unemployment rate (Bell, 2001 for a review). The positive 
influence of the unemployment rate on the welfare participation rate 
may appear clear when considering the existence of the AFDC-
Unemployed Parent program since 1961. However, this influence may 
appear not clear when looking at the data at aggregate level. As Figure 
1 shows, a decline (increase) in the unemployment rate is not 
necessarily associated with a decline (increase) in the welfare 
participation rate, although the two variables are positively correlated (r 
= 0.49, p-value = 0.001). Hence, a deeper analysis seems necessary.  
The main empirical analysis in this paper is based on annual data for 
the period of 1960-2000 from Current Population Survey for the 
unemployment rate, and from the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) for the welfare participation rate. Data prior to 1960 
are not used as the AFDC program was still Aid to Dependent Children, 
and the share of adults on the rolls was minimal. Moreover, the DHHS 
has not yet provided data on the welfare participation rate prior to 1960 
(and posterior to June 2000). Both the welfare participation rate and the 
unemployment rate can be treated as stationary series. The KPSS test 
with intercept (no trend) does not reject the null hypothesis of 
stationarity in both two cases as the test-statistics for U and B are 0.19 
and 0.33 respectively, while the critical value at 5% level is 0.46. Hence, 
non-transformed data are used in the empirical analysis.  
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4. Structural model 
The main argument behind the empirical model in this paper is the 
following. As seen in Section 2, existing studies can be divided in two 
groups. The first group of studies has discussed the influence of the 
unemployment rate U on the welfare participation rate B (for instance 
CEA, 1997; CEA, 1999; Ziliak and Figlio, 1999; Ziliak et al. 2000, 
Klerman and Haider, 2002). These studies have also discussed the 
influence of the welfare reforms on B. The second group of studies has 
discussed the influence of the welfare reforms on employment and labor 
force (for instance Moffitt, 1999; Schoeni and Blank, 2000; Meyer and 
Rosenbaum, 2000; Grogger, 2001; Martinson, 2000). If a political 
choice to modify the share of population on welfare assistance may 
affect employment and labor force, then the second group of studies 
has indirectly discussed the influence of B on U. For completeness, it is 
worth to remind that the second group of studies has also discussed the 
influence of factors different from welfare reforms on employment and 
labor force. This paper puts together the first group of studies (those 
directly discussing the influence of U on B) and the second group of 
studies (those indirectly discussing the influence of B on U) in assuming 
that the relationship between U and B can be summarized by the 
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assistance. Analogously, the structural shock in equation (1) is an 
exogenous shock to the unemployment rate. For instance, a Keynesian 
economist would interpret it as an exogenous shock to the growth rate 
of effective demand which is transferred to the growth rate of GDP and, 
in turn, to the unemployment rate.  
The reduced-form model is the following: 
 









and  Ai  is a 2×2 matrix for i = 1,…, p. 
 







where   
 
 
and   
 
 
is a diagonal matrix. 
 
Structural decomposition is based on a Sims-Bernanke procedure as 
described by Enders (1995, pp. 324-327). Identification is Cholesky-
type with the welfare participation rate ordered last. Therefore, it is 
assumed that a shock to the welfare participation rate does not have an 
































































− + Φ + Φ =
p
i
t i t i t v y y
1
0





− − = A e e E A v v E t t t t
) ' ( t te e E 
 14  
This assumption is consistent with the existing literature that primarily 
stresses the influence of the unemployment rate on the welfare 
participation rate (Bell, 2001). However, estimated IRFs are highly 
robust to a different ordering and to a generalized approach (Pesaran 
and Shin, 1998). They are also robust to a Blanchard-Quah 
identification (1989) assuming that the accumulated response of B to U 
converges to zero. The assumption that the accumulated response of B 
to U converges to zero should be justified on a theoretical ground. 
Unfortunately, no well-established theory on (the short-run and) the 
long-run relationship between U and B is available. Indeed, one reason 
to perform a VAR analysis is just to derive some stylized facts that can 
be modeled afterwards. However, the assumption that the accumulated 
response of B to U converges to zero can be justified on an empirical 
ground. It is, in fact, one of our main empirical results when using a 
Choleski-type identification (B last) or a generalized approach.     
5. Estimation and stylized facts 
The order of the VAR is chosen using the maximum likelihood ratio test. 




is rejected. Akaike and Schwarz criteria confirm this choice. Therefore, 
the dynamic specification of the estimated model (the number of lags) is 
not arbitrarily chosen. This is a way to deal with the dynamic 
specification puzzle of existing research, described in Section 2 (see 
also Bell, 2001; Klerman and Haider, 2002). 
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Table 1 contains a Granger-causality test. Figures 2 and Figure 3  plot 
the impulse response functions (IRFs). The results seem very 
interesting. Following Christiano et al. (1996), the VAR approach is 
used to derive stylized facts. In this case, the empirical analysis 
suggests the following two facts: 
1.  The unemployment rate (U) does not Granger-cause the welfare 
participation rate (B). In the short-run, it is doubtful whether a shock 
reducing (increasing) U predicts a reduction (increase) in B (see 
confidence interval). The accumulated response of B to U converges to 
zero. 
2.  The welfare participation rate does Granger-cause the 
unemployment rate (at 10% level). In the short-run, a shock reducing 
(increasing) B predicts a reduction (increase) in U. The accumulated 
response of U to a negative (positive) shock to B converges to a 
negative (positive) number. 
6. Has the fall in the unemployment rate caused the fall in the 
welfare participation rate?  
The first stylized fact is at odds with the findings of a large part of the 
literature, for instance with the findings by the CEA (1997, 1999), Ziliak 
et al. (2000), Figlio and Ziliak (1999), Levine and Whitmore (1998), 
Wallace and Blank (1999), Blank (2001), Bartik and Eberts (1999). An 
explanation for this surprising result is that cited studies have focused 
on the effect of U on B without considering the interaction between U 
and B, instead captured by the VAR analysis. Data do not support the 
idea that the decline in the unemployment rate somehow led the decline 
in the welfare participation rate in the 1990s. This result is consistent 
with the fact that the UP recipients, those more directly affected by the 
level of unemployment, has never been more than 12% of total 
recipients, with an average of 8%. And, the average fells to 3% if only 
UP adults are considered (US Department of Health and Human 
Services, 1998).   
 16  
If it is doubtful whether the unemployment rate affects the welfare 
participation rate, it is less doubtful whether welfare policy does it. Let’s 
see why.  
It is possible to recover the structural shocks to both the welfare 









are plotted in Figures 4-5. First of all, Figures 4-5 confirm that the 1990s 
were characterized by several negative shocks to both the welfare 
participation rate and the unemployment rate, as supposed in Section 2. 
It is worth to remind that a negative structural shock to the welfare 
participation rate can be interpreted as political choice to reduce the 
share of population on welfare rolls. 
Further, a brief discussion of the effects of past welfare policies may 
help to understand the experience of the last decade. Let’s, for 
instance, consider the late 1960s. The rise in the welfare participation 
rate in the late 1960s can be associated with the ‘unconditional war on 
poverty’ made by President Johnson (Moffitt, 2002). This ‘war’ started 
with the introduction of Food Stamps and Medicaid in 1965. AFDC 
caseloads were made automatically eligible, rising propensity of poor 
families to enter the AFDC program. Moreover various political groups, 
such as the National Welfare Rights Organization, encouraged needy 
families to apply for AFDC benefits. The politics of the ‘Great Society’ 
induced States to accept more applications. It also happened in force of 
Supreme Court decisions that imposed States to eliminate, being at 
adds with the Social Security Act, some restrictions to eligibility such as 
residency requirements or the so-called ‘man-in-the-house rule’. In 
addition, in 1967, the Government decreased the benefit reduction rate 
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The impact of this change on the welfare participation rate was surely 




allowed families with income above of the guarantee level, say G, to be 




Instead, the benefit reduction rate of 1 implied non-eligibility of every 
family  with income above of the guarantee level. 
Let’s make an additional example on the possible link between the level 
of B and welfare policy intervention. In 1981, the Omnibus Budget 




to 1. Except for few months of earnings disregard, a 100% benefit 
reduction rate made non-eligible many families with income a little 
above of the guarantee level. In addition, the OBRA introduced a 
federal income-limit for eligibility, and also included an eventual 
stepparent’s income in calculation of total family income. The sum of 
these 1981 changes probably caused the recipients to decrease from 
11.1 millions in 1981 to 10.4 millions in 1982.  
An increase in B was also registered in the early 1990s. This increase 
can be - at least partly - related to the 1988 Family Support Act (FSA) 
and to its 1990 reinforcement. In 1988, Government made participation 
in the AFDC-UP program mandatory for every State receiving welfare 
matching grants. The new law had transitory rules for those States not 
offering the UP program in 1988 which had to build it up. The transition 
period expired in October 1990 and the number of States offering 
AFDC-UP jumped from 28 in 1990 to 52 in 1991. Further, the FSA 
made mandatory State medical assistance for AFDC families, rising 
propensity of poor to apply for AFDC.   
In conclusion, the first stylized fact and some additional arguments 
(presented so far) make hard to believe that the decline in the welfare 
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decline in the unemployment rate, as the majority view suggests (Bell, 
2001). The fall in B should be mainly or totally attributed to the 
restrictive welfare reforms, under the assumption that the literature is 
right in considering two main explanations for this fall (which is not 
obvious).  
Let’s guess, for a moment, that this conclusion is wrong. Then there are 
several questions to be answered. How could one explain the radical 
fall in the number of non-adult recipients in Figure 6? Have children left 
welfare for work like their parents? Have they lost eligibility due to 
income improvement of their parents? Since children do not generally 
work and the literature does not provide sufficient evidence of income 
improvement for adult welfare leavers (Weil, 2002), the fall in the 
number of non-adult recipients can only be explained as effect of 
restrictive welfare reforms (see also Edelman, 1997). 
Regarding the second VAR stylized fact, it is consistent with various 
findings in the literature: for instance with the findings by Moffitt (1999), 
Schoeni and Blank (2000), Grogger (2001), Meyer and Rosenbaum 
(2000), Martinson (2000), Kaushal and Kaestner (2001). Data seem to 
support the idea that a political choice to contract (expand) the welfare 
participation rate can reduce (increase) the unemployment rate. The 
next Section is aimed to discuss theoretical issues behind this result. 
We also wonder whether the reduction in the welfare participation rate, 
due to a political choice, had an impact on the reduction of the 
unemployment rate in the 1990s. 
7. Has the fall in the welfare participation rate inflated the fall in the 
unemployment rate? 
The idea that the number of welfare caseloads can affect the official 
unemployment level is not new in the economic theory. It is associated, 
at least since 1937, with the concept of disguised unemployment 
introduced by Joan Robinson (1980). Disguised unemployment can be 
defined as the number of people holding peripheral jobs in an economy. 
In Robinson’s view, total employment in an economy is given by the 
sum of regular employment, say R, and disguised unemployment, say  
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D. The latter is highly affected by the number of people willing to do 
peripheral jobs. In fact D can be lower than its potential level 
determined by the effective demand, while this is less likely to happen 
for R. The basic idea is the following: if public assistance allows more 
people to survive without doing peripheral jobs, then less people will be 
willing to do such jobs. Therefore, disguised unemployment could be 
lower than its potential level and official unemployment might be higher 
than its potential level. Formally, one could argue that R is always equal 
to the number of non-peripheral jobs available (determined by the 
effective demand), while D is the minimum between the number of 
peripheral jobs available, say Y (determined by the effective demand), 
and the number of people willing to do peripheral jobs, say X (negatively 
affected the number of people on public assistance). Then, if there is an 
excess of Y over X, a fall in the number of people on welfare rolls 
increases the level of disguised unemployment.    
The economic expansion since 1993 increased both non-peripheral and 
peripheral job opportunities. The decrease in the number of caseloads, 
due to a political choice, probably increased the number of people 
willing to accept peripheral jobs (Solow, 1997), so boosting growth in 
disguised unemployment. The latter would have been lower in absence 
of the welfare reforms, as the increase in peripheral job opportunities 
would have been followed by a lower increase in the number of people 
willing to do those jobs.  
This kind of reasoning suggests that the fall in the welfare participation 
rate since its 1994 peak, due to the welfare reforms, may have inflated 
the fall in the unemployment rate in the 1990s. Our second stylized fact 
supports this conclusion. Theoretically, a fall in the share of population 
on welfare assistance reduces the unemployment rate if the induced 
increase in the share of population with at least a peripheral job is 
higher that the induced increase in the share of population searching at 
least a peripheral job. In other words, a fall in B reduces U if the induced 
percent increase in total employment due to disguised unemployment is 
higher than the induced percent increase in total labor force (assuming 
that the fall in B has a negligible effect on the percent increase in total 
employment due to regular employment). It is possible to argue that the 
percent increase in total employment due to disguised unemployment, 
not exclusively induced by the fall in B, was not a minor issue from 1994  
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to 2000. In fact, some industries leading employment growth have been 
actually leading growth in disguised unemployment. 
As known, services and retail commerce were the sectors with the 
highest absolute employment growth in the 1990s (Hatch and Clinton, 
2000). One aim of this Section is to argue that these two sectors were 
characterized by presence of disguised unemployment in a certain 
share of total employment. In addition, more important, some industries 
of retail commerce and services, among those leading employment 
growth, have actually been leading growth in disguised unemployment. 
In the famous dictionary The New Palgrave, Bhaduri (1987) writes that 
‘some persons may be unemployed in a disguised manner not only in 
the sense of having a very low earning rate i.e. income-wise 
unemployment but also in the sense of relatively light work intensity per 
day, i.e. time-disposition-wise unemployment. And, unless one believes 
in the neoclassical proposition that income necessarily reflects the 
marginal product, one would have to devise, a third (and separate) 
criterion of disguised unemployment in terms of abnormally low 
productivity of labour’ (Bhaduri, 1987; p. 864). On the lines of Bhaduri, a 
sector can present disguised unemployment if some of the following 
features are features of the sector: 
1.  a low annual GDP per employed;  
2.  a low number of weekly hours of work; 
3.  a low hourly wage. 
Table 2 suggests that retail commerce and services are likely to present 
disguised unemployment in a certain share of total employment, as they 
show the lowest values of productivity, work-time and wages both in 
1994 and in 2000. Let’s discuss two possible criticisms. 
First, a lower product per employed in a sector can be due to a lower 
capital-labor ratio in the sector, not to workers less productive, qualified 
or ‘worse’ in some sense. The difficulty of measuring the capital-labor 
ratio actually used by each sector is well-known. This difficulty implies 
that data on the capital-labor ratios are not available. Table 2 tries to 
deal with this issue, providing data on the stock of private fixed assets 
per employed. Differences in these ‘capital’-labor ratios can be used as 
proxies of differences in the actual capital-labor ratios. Of course, our 
‘capital’-labor ratios should be taken with caution, as data on public 
fixed assets used by each sector are not available. Taken into account 
the above, Table 2 shows that the sector of construction has a higher  
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average productivity than retail commerce and services, although the 
sector uses a lower stock of ‘capital’ per employed.  
Second, a lower weekly work-time in retail commerce and services can 
be due to more qualified jobs in these sectors, not to more part-time 
jobs. However, this hypothesis is clearly at odds with data on wages. 
More qualified jobs should imply higher hourly wages, which is not the 
case.  
To conclude, the coincidence of three disguised unemployment 
indicators makes quite likely a lower average quality of labor in retail 
commerce and services.  
As retail commerce and services have a lower average quality of labor, 
some industries of the two sectors are likely to have a very low quality 
of labor, such that  employment in these industries can be thought as 
disguised unemployment. Let’s focus on those industries of retail 
commerce and services leading employment growth in the 1990s. Data 
from the US Census Bureau (in Table 3) report that there are four 
leader-industries in services, i.e. Help supply services, Computer and 
data processing services, Health services, Social services, while there 
is one leader-industry in retail commerce, namely Eating and drinking 
places.  
Let’s focus on Eating and drinking places. This industry includes all 
types of restaurants, but the most common types are those of fast-food 
where part-time jobs are typical (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2003, pp. 
122-125). The average weekly wage is very low: only 177 dollars in 
2000, while the average in the private sector is 474 dollars. The industry 
experienced an employment growth of about one million people from 
1994 to 2000, which can be - at least partly - considered as growth in 
disguised unemployment.  
Similar arguments hold for Help supply services (and, partly, for Social 
Services). The 1994-2000 employment growth of this industry can be - 
at least partly - considered as growth in disguised unemployment. This 
is an industry employing temporary workers, actually used in other 
sectors or industries. As disguised unemployed are the first to lose their 
jobs when bad times arrive, Help supply services experienced very 
strong job losses since September 2000. In one year, the industry lost 
45% of their 1994-2000 employment growth (see Table 4).  
As stated before, we have focused on industries leading employment 
growth. Nevertheless, welfare reforms may have induced growth in  
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1994 N
disguised unemployment in industries not leading employment growth, 
but still contributing to it.  
An answer to the question entitling this Section is uneasy. Let’s start 
from a simple year-to-year problem, where the two reference-years are 




can be seen as the sum of the percent increase in total employment 













is available in the official statistics, a first step could be to estimate the 




A way to estimate disguised unemployment in a sector in a given year 
(and than in the whole economy in that year) is to make an assumption 
on the meaning of ‘very low’, ‘relatively light’ or ‘abnormally low’ in 
Bhaduri’s definition. For instance, Eatwell (1995) maintains that a sector 
has disguised unemployment if it has a product per person employed 
less than 80% of that in manufacturing. Therefore, disguised 
unemployment is computed as the number of employed in the sector 
that would become unemployed if the product per person employed 
would be equal to 80%, instead than lower. As already argued, a lower 
productivity in a sector can be due to a lower capital-labor ratio in the 
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Eatwell argues that 20% is a ‘decent margin of error’ to take into 
account this fact, justifying his choice as ‘a rule of thumb’. One might 
argue that 20% is not a ‘decent margin of error’ as Eatwell does not 
provide a measurement of the capital-labor ratio in each sector. 
However, our data on the stock of ‘capital’ per employed seem to 
support Eatwell’s criterion. In fact, the sector of construction shows a 
product per employed lower than manufacturing, but likely due to a 
lower capital-labor ratio (Table 2). Therefore, this sector should not be 
found to contain disguised unemployment using Eatwell’s criterion. In 
fact, this sector has a product per employed higher than 80% of that in 
manufacturing. As reasonable, Eatwell’s criterion detects disguised 
unemployment in retail commerce and services only.  








(17.9 millions). These estimates allow to compute the percent increase 
in total employment due to disguised unemployment  d . Our estimates 
suggest d = 2.4%. However, our estimates should be taken with caution 
because of two facts:  
1.  differences in wages and hours of work are not considered in 
computing disguised unemployment;  
2.  estimates are strictly dependent of the assumption of a  20% 
‘margin of error’.  
In addition, it is important to stress that our computation does not allow 
to know the share of d explained by the fall in B, and that explained by 
other factors.  
An answer to the question entitling this Section requires an additional 
step, after estimating d . We need to measure the percent growth in 
total labor force induced by the fall in the share of population on welfare 
rolls. The best available estimates, provided by Bartik (1998), suggest 
that the welfare reforms have increased labor force of about 1 million 
people from 1994 to 2000. Therefore, it is possible to calculate the 
1994 D
2000 D 
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1994-2000 percent growth in labor force roughly due to the fall in B, say 
.  . Our computation suggests     = 0.8%.  
An appropriate conclusion of this Section is that a full answer to 
question entitling the Section cannot be provided as we do not know the 
share of d explained by the fall in B. A preliminary evidence can be 
based on both our second VAR stylized fact and the finding that d  is 
much higher than . However, future research on this topic  is needed 
and welcome. 
8. Conclusions 
A report by the Council of Economic Advisers (1997) started a large 
research effort about the effects of the unemployment rate on the 
welfare participation rate and vice versa, with special regard to the 
1990s in the United States. In this paper the relationship between the 
unemployment rate and the welfare participation rate is examined in a 
structural VAR. It is found that the unemployment rate does not help to 
predict the welfare participation rate, while the converse is true.   
Moreover, an exogenous negative shock to the welfare participation 
rate predicts a reduction in the unemployment rate. The conclusion is 
that the decline in the welfare participation rate in the 1990s should be 
attributed to restrictive welfare reforms, not to the fall in the 
unemployment rate. Further, the political choice to reduce the welfare 
participation rate may have inflated the reduction in the unemployment 
rate, by increasing the number of people willing to accept peripheral 
jobs, for instance in the Eating and drinking places. 
λλ
λ 
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Appendix 
This Appendix contains a number of technical notes on the main 
empirical analysis. It also highlights possible criticism.  
  The low dimension of the VAR negatively affects the generality 
of the study. A higher number of variables would make this study more 
general but also less closed to the existing literature. The choice of 
being as closed as possible to the existing research is aimed to strength 
assonances and dissonances.  
  Each time series used in this paper, namely U and B, has 41 
annual observations. As the VAR model has required estimation of 10 
parameters, the number of observations might be a source of distortion. 
However, to the extent of our knowledge, better data on national welfare 
caseloads are not available.  
  Another note is about the presence of unit roots. The 
autocorrelogram analysis suggests that each series can be represented 
as AR(2) process. The conceptual nature of each series indicates the 
need of an intercept. The estimated AR(2) coefficients and the intercept 
are statistically significant for both B and U. Every lag after the second 
is not significant. The AR(2) structure with intercept allows to run a ADF 













35 . 2 −
28 . 2 −
60 . 2 − 
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The unit root hypothesis is not rejected in both two cases. This is a 
crucial point: if the series are non-stationary, our analysis may have 
some problems. However, it is unlikely that U and B are non-stationary 
series. In fact, it is well-known that unit-root tests have low power, i.e. 
low probability of rejecting a false null-hypothesis of a unit root (Enders, 
1995 p. 251). Moreover, it is hard to think that the long-run multiplier of 
the unemployment rate is not finite. The same reasoning applies to the 
welfare participation rate. Further, all the IRFs in the VAR converge to 
zero (not shown in Figure 2), the accumulated IRFs converge to a finite 
number (Figure 3), and the KPSS test does not reject the null 
hypothesis of stationarity. In addition, our choice of not differencing data 
is consistent with the majority view. In fact, ‘ Sims (1980) and others, 
such as Doan (1992), recommend against differencing even if the 
variables contain a unit roots. They argue that the goal of VAR analysis 
is to determine the interrelationships among the variables, not the 
parameters estimates. […Further,] the majority view is that the form of 
the variables in the VAR should mimic the true data-generating process. 
This is particularly true if the aim is to estimate a structural 
model.’(Enders, 1995 p. 301).  
  Although it is unlikely that U and B are non-stationary series, the 
results of the ADF test suggest to inspect for a cointegrated relation 




this information is used to run a Johansen cointegration test. The 
likelihood ratio criterion rejects every cointegration at 5% level. This 








In both two cases, estimated residuals have AR(2) representation (as 
the autocorrelogram analysis suggests) without intercept. Every lag 
2 = p
1 1 0 resid B U + + = α α
2 1 0 resid U B + + = β β 
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after the second is not significant. The ADF test without intercept and 








for the residuals of equation (2). Table B9 in Hamilton (1994) indicates 




Then residuals are non-stationary.  
  A variance decomposition analysis shows that the variance in B 
explains 40% of the variance in U, while the variance in U explains only 
10% of the variance in B. This result is affected by the low dimension of 
the VAR. However, the magnitude of the difference suggests that, in a 
more general framework, the variance in U explained by the variance in 
B is likely to be higher than the variance in B explained by the variance 
in U.   
  Our Granger-causality test provides a sufficiently clear indication 
on the Granger-exogeneity of B with respect to U. An unclear indication 
is regarding the Granger-exogeneity of U with respect to B, as the null-
hypothesis that B does not Granger-cause U is rejected at 10% level (p-
value 0.08). The choice of stressing that B may Granger-cause U is 
because this result is consistent with a part of the existing literature (as 
already stressed). Finally, it is important to underline that our Granger-
causality results are to be taken with some caution due to the results of 
the ADF test.      
  Another note is related to identification. As known, identification 
of a structural model is controversial and it is uneasy to make the right 
choice. Our choice of a relatively simple method is due to the lack of a 
formal U-B theory, supporting a more complex identification method. 
We have chosen of ‘letting data speak’ in order to derive stylized facts 
that may be modeled by other researchers. As already stressed, our 
ordering is justified by the existing literature that primarily underlines the 
24 . 3 −
89 . 2 −
37 . 3 − 
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influence of U on B. Therefore, the literature’s agreement on the 
influence of U on B is criticized by our first stylized fact, under a non-
favorable initial assumption. This should make the argument more 
convincing.     
  A final note is concerning with the VAR assumption of a relation 
between U and B linear in levels. A simple scatter plot suggests that the 
relation between U and B might be non-linear in levels. Under the 
assumption of a relation between U and B non-linear in levels while 
linear in logarithms, a structural VAR with the two main variables in 
logarithms can be estimated. The only difference with respect to the 
empirical analysis of this paper is related to the Granger-causality test: 
the null-hypothesis that lnB does not Granger-cause lnU is rejected at 
5% level (p-value 0.03). This finding supports the argument that the 
welfare participation rate helps to predict the unemployment rate.  
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Table 1  
 
Granger Causality Tests (2 lags) 
 
 
    
Null Hypothesis  F-stat. P-value
B does not Granger Cause U 2.59  0.08 
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Table 2 
 
Disguised Unemployment Indicators and Stock of ‘Capital’ per Employed 
Source: US Census Bureau (2001, p. 391). US Bureau of Economic Analysis 
<http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn2/gpoc.htm> .  




Note: Public sector is not considered in this Table.  
   












  Hourly Earnings (current dollars) 
1994 12.07  14.73  13.78  12.06  7.49  11.83  11.04 
2000 14.38  17.14  16.22  15.18  9.45  15.07  13.88 
  Weekly Hours   
1994  42.0  38.9  39.7  38.4 28.9 35.8  32.5 
2000  41.5  39.3  38.5  38.5 28.9 36.3  32.7 
  Annual GDP per Employed (current dollars) 
 
1994  66,764  55,214  102,172  77,766 30,262 181,960  43,224 
2000  82,459  68,984  115,730  98,780 38,351 259,477  52,406 
  Private Fixed Assets per Employed (current dollars) 
1994  75,719  18,742  357,602  56,914 23,523 1,317,798  22,006 
2000  96,401  21,478  395,199  76,731 30,415 1,694,119  27,868 
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Table 3 
 
Employment Change in 1990-2000 by Selected Industries (in Thousands) 
 
     
 1990-1994 1994-2000 1990-2000 
Retail commerce  709  2,826  3,535 
General merchandise stores  –67  280  213 
Food stores  29  271  300 
Automotive dealers and service stations  84  267  351 
Apparel and accessory stores  –34  50  16 
Furniture and home furnishing stores  75  223  298 
Eating and drinking places  547  1,009  1,556 
Services  3,870 8,580 12,450 
Hotels and other lodging places  –24  303  279 
      Hotels and motels   –27  300  273 
Personal services  33  139  172 
      Laundry, cleaning, garment services    6  25  31 
      Beauty shops  11  44  55 
Business  services  1,308 3,299 4,607 
      Advertising   5  53  58 
      Personnel supply services  806  1,493  2,299 
           Employment agencies  75  95  170 
           Help supply services  733  1,398  2,131 
      Computer and data processing services 217  952  1,169 
           Prepackaged software  42  163  205 
           Data processing and software  35  52  87 
Auto repair, services, and parking  130  154  284 
      Automotive repair shops   67  69  136 
Motion pictures  75  148  223 
      Motion pictures theaters  3  17  20 
Amusement and recreation services  193  502  695 
Health  services  1,218 1,107 2,325 
      Offices and clinics of medical doctors  224  371  595 
      Nursing and personal care facilities  218  158  376 
      Hospital  241  229  470 
      Home health care services  242  109  351 
Legal  services  34 69 103 
Educational services  84  610  694 
Social  services  515 714 1,229 
Membership  services  108 387 495 
Engineering and management services  132  803  935  
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Table 4 
 












Source: McMenamin et al. (2003, p. 7-8). 
 
Table 5 
Measuring Disguised Unemployment (in Thousands) 
 
 









Note: Whole economy includes Public sector (no evidence of disguised unemployment 
in Public sector).   
Source: US Census Bureau (2001, p. 391) 
    
  2000-2001 2001-2002 
Retail commerce  – 31  – 184 
Eating and drinking places  24   – 106 
    
Services 38  539 
Business services  – 599  0 
       Personnel supply services  – 701  5 
               Help supply services   – 633  24 
       Computer and data processing services 52  – 33 
Health services  323  270 
Social services  171  85 
    
      






Retail commerce 8,887  9,685  797 
Services 6,022  8,301  2,278 
Whole economy  14,910  17,986  3,076 
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Source: US Department of Health and Human Services 
<http://www.acf.hhs.gov/news/stats/6097rf.htm> 
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Figure 4 
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Figure 6 
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